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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
YERX B.

~IILLARD,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

I'

-YS.-

JESSE H. PARRY and ELSIE H.
PARRY, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents,
~~
STRAN"D ELECTRIC SERVICE
CO~IP AXY, a corporation, and
OTTO DREWS,
Defendants.
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Case
No. 8026

Reply Brief of Appellant
~nssrrATE1fENT

OF RECORD BY RESPONDENTS

The respondents do not dispute the rules of law
cited by the appellant. Nor do despondents show wherein the appellant has failed to state the facts in accordance with the record, as required by Rule 75 (p) (2) in
the event of disagreement with the Statement of Facts
in the Brief of Appellant. Throughout their brief,
respondents misstate some of the salient facts, and make
a number of misleading statements which distort the
1
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picture of the events. Respondents quote from defendant
Parry, but avoid quoting or referring to his admissions
on cross-examination, ignoring the rule that testimony
is no hPt ter than where it is left on cross-examination.
The respondents attempt to make it appear that the
appellant as general contractor failed to do what he
agreed to do, and they gloss oYer the undisputed fact
that he followed the instructions of the architect who
was the agent for defendant Jesse H. Parry until termination of services on July 19, 1951. Respondents also
sever some of the evidence from its context to present
a misleading perspective of the facts.
For example, on page 3 of their brief they state that
''Prior to the signing of the contract discussion was had
as to the type of windows which were known as Pella
units ", and that the specifications stated that such
windows shall ''be installed according to the manufacturer's direction as part of the carpentry contract.''
Respondents ignore the undisputed testimony that plaintiff stated that he was unfamiliar with that type of
window, and that he wanted to know how much to allow
for costs of installation. The architect told plaintiff not
to figure any cost for installation, as most of said windows would be installed in masonry and would be set by
the brick masons. The architect admitted that he so
instructed the plaintiff. Respondents also quote from
page 34 of the specifications :
''provide all necessary material and labor for the
installation of a 4-inch diameter soil pipe sewer
2
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from the building and connecting to the city sewer
as shown on the plot plan.''
r~nwre

was no plot plan in existence at that time.
The specifications do not state that the general contractor shall do that particular work. Article 35 of the
contract document reserves the right to the owner to
let other contracts in connection with the work. The
architect as agent of the respondents, specifically told
:.\[r. :.\[illard not to figure on the sewer or water as those
items would be taken care of by the owners under a
different contract.
The architect also told plaintiff not to bid on more
than a 9-inch wall at the top story. The architect in
giving instructions on bidding, told plaintiff to exclude
those specific items, and also to base his bid on the
plumbing figure which expressly excluded the sewer and
water lines. Defendant Parry went ahead and con, structed the sewer in his own way, disregarding the plot
plan which came out in April 1951, and even increased
the cost by use of cast iron pipe and by running the
line diagonally across the front of the property. He did
not bill plaintiff for that cost nor for any other excluded
item. No claim was made until the time of trial that
plaintiff had any obligation to do any of the work which
the architect told plaintiff to exclude in making up his
bid and in reducing his bid at the request of the architect
who was the agent of the Parrys.
One of the worst distortions in the Brief of Respondents, relates to the stipulation dated April 10,
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1953. It was signed by plaintiff at the request of defendants Parry to enable the Parrys to "stop the running of interest''. In preparing the findings of fact,
conclusions of law and judgment, counsel for the respondt>Id s twisted and distorted the stipulation into a purported agreement to relieve the Parrys of liability for
accrued interest and costs due to their willful failure
to pay.
In arguing Point 1, respondents avoid reference to
the fact that the counterclaim of defendant Parry was
dismissed and no appeal was taken from said portion
of the judgment. The respondents had a judgment
entered against plaintiff in the sum of $435.30, which
was based upon a misquotation of the stipulation, and
which "·as inconsistent with the dismissal of the counterclaim. The contention that plaintiff could have objected
timely, is unwarranted, for the judgment had already
been entered before plaintiff's attorney was able to
contact the trial judge.
In arguing Point 2, the respondents evade the facts
by saying that the defendants Parry denied there was
any lienright. The findings show that there was a valid
lienright, for there was money due and owing from
November 1951 which was unpaid at the time of trial.
The contention that plaintiff did not object to the order
for release of the lien, contradicts the record, for plaintiff stated in the release that he executed the same
under compulsion and that he intended to have the
4
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portion of the judgment requiring the same, vacated
on appeal.
In arguing Point 3, respondents make the unwarranted assertion that plaintiff did not make any claim
for extras, Items 41 to 60, until the time of trial and
that defendants wrre therefore exempted from liability
for interest. Liability did not accrue from billing, but
from performance of the work, which was completed in
Xovember 1951. Furthermore, Exhibit P-14 was prepared after trial started to itemize the various changes
and increased costs because defendants at the trial made
the claim for the first time that recovery could only be
had for any amount in excess of $82,000, as "extras".
All of those items were included in the billing on a costplus basis October 30, 1951, and in the corrected billing
of December 28, 1951. The statement that the defendants
Parry did not know anything about the cost-plus basis
until January 1952 is utterly false, as Mr. Parry admitted
that ~[r. :Jiillard presented Exhibit P-8 to him on
October 30, 1951. Exhibit P-9 was issued as of December
28, 1951, because of discovery of some errors. The fact
that the bookkeeper gave the Parrys some statements
as late as November 1951 on ''extras'' is immaterial, as
the Parrys who were running things to suit themselves,
had conferences with the bookkeeper. Mr. Millard did
not authorize the bookkeeper to issue those statements.
Anyway, they related to the period prior to discharge
of the architect, and they were not complete.
The testimony of Mr. Parry is quoted to the effect
that the original contract was not abandoned notwith5
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standing he dismissed the architect, and also that he
agreed to pay Mr. Millard the 10% theretofore being
withheld. Exhibit P-13 shows that the testimony of
defendant Parry is false, as neither he (nor his wife
who wrote the checks) paid the 10% which had been
withheld. The billings were on a cost-plus basis after
July 19, 1951. There was a general billing on October 30,
1951, covering the entire job on a cost-plus basis. The
final billing of December 28, 1951, was a correction of
the one dated October 30, 1951. Not only did the Parrys
fail to register any objection to the one dated December
28, 1951, but they made at least two payments in accordance with the instructions of the letter which accompanied such billing. They did not see fit to have their
attorney confer with counsel for plaintiff, as they were
invited to do, and which they would have done if they
then had believed they had any reasonable basis for
questioning the propriety of any item, or the method
of billing.
By argument of Point 4, respondents contend that
the foreclosure action failed, and that respondents were
therefore entitled to costs and attorney fees. Their claim
is a classic misstatement of the record, for the court
found that at the time of trial there was money due and
owing for construction, which had not been paid. The
only purpose of such an action is to collect the money
owing. Respondents have ignored the law as well as
the facts.
6
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In arguing Point 5, respondents admit that plaintiff
had a right to terminate the contract if there was loss
due to the interference of the Parrys, page 25 of Brief
of RespondPnts. Claim is made that the evidence shows
that the Parrys were at the job site only 15 minutes per
day. The testimony relied on is incredible for the reason
the Parrys professed to know just what the men were
doing, and shows that they talked to the men who were
working and ordered many cha:p.ges; yet they claim they
did not interfere. There is no dispute about the fact
that there were heated controversies between the architect and the Parrys over interference, and that plaintiff
repeatedly complained about the greatly increased costs
occasioned thereby.
Respondents are consistent only in ignoring most of
the salient facts. They assert that the figures written
on the plumbing bid by the architect show computations
for sewer pipe and water service. Those figures were
not a part of that bid. The architect did not testify
that he told plaintiff to include sewer and water in his
bid. He testified exactly to the contrary.
In arguing Point 6, respondents disregard the undisputed facts, and claim that plaintiff was liable for
the installation of the sewer when he was told not to
include it in his bid, and also despite the fact that defendant Parry did not bill plaintiff nor claim any offset
until the time of trial. He even was awarded an offset
for running a longer sewer line with the increased cost
of iron pipe.

7
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In arguing Point 7, respondents take the attitude
that plaintiff is "hooked" by some statement on extras
iHHtwd by the bookkeeper without the knowledge of plaintiff and without his authorization, particularly when they
rPiah•d to events prior to abrogation of the contract.
Respondents glo:-~s overt lw fact that they had conferences
with the bookkeeper, and claimed they were "getting
nowhere". They were running the job, but they now
want to leave plaintiff with over $20,000 of the costs
which tlwy caused him to incur.
Respondents admit that ~Ir. :Merrill, foreman, testified to various costs of additional work and changes.
There \\'aS not a matter of guesswork on his part as to
costs, even if the i terns were to be charged as "extras",
for every conceivable attempt was made to break down
his testimony as to details. He knew exactly what he
was talking about. Respondents ignore the fact that
their own testimony was that ''extras'' were to be paid
for not on some disputed basis of "reasonable value",
but on the basis of "cost plus 10% ", and respondents
refused to pay the costs or any portion thereof. Mr.
lVIerrill is not under obligation to :Mr. Millard. No one
disputed his testimony as to the actual costs. There were
some attempts to show that someone might estimate them
at a lesser figure, but that was not co:rp.petent evidence.
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CONCLUSION
Respondents haYe not directly disputed any facts
related by plaintiff. The Brief of Respondents does not
question the rules of law cited in the Brief of Appellant.
Respondents have distorted the picture, which illustrates
that respondents ·were trying to get a free ride for an
apartment house worth at least $24,000 more than they
originally bargained for, at the expense of appellant.
It is respectfully urged that respondents raise no
genuine dispute as to the facts and law as submitted in
the Brief of Appellant, and that the appellant is entitled
to the relief sought in his original brief.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL E. REIMANN
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant.

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

